PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE NETHERLANDS AND FLANDERS
One of the first to apply phenomenological method in the Netherlands was the Philosopher and linguist Hendrick J. Pos (1898 Pos ( -1955 . He invited Husserl in 1928 to give the so-called Amsterdamer Vortrage (Amsterdam Lectures) on phenomenological psychology. But it was not until after World War II that phenomenology became more deeply established in Dutch philosophy. The primary sway of influence now came from the south, from France. Heidegger's influence was important, but it was especially the French existentialists such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Albert Camus, Gabriel Marcel, Emmanuel Levinas, and in particular Maurice Merleau-Ponty who dominated the philosophical scene in the Netherlands and Flanders. Much of the immediate postwar Dutch phenomenology was marked less by originality than by a reworking of the intellectual scholarship "translated" from French. This French orientation in Dutch philosophy can be explained in several ways. First, prewar philosophy in the Netherlands was essentially philosophical anthropology. And the concerns of philosophical anthropology resonate more strongly in the writings of the French phenomen-ologists than in the more epistemological and methodologically focussed works of Husserl. Second, the postwar period was marked by an intense interest in cultural concerns and the kinds of questions that were posed and addressed by the French existentialists. In their works, the individual had no recourse to anything but his or her personal freedom and responsibility in a manner described in the early writings of Sartre. Third, the existing religious institutions could no longer offer comfortable answers to the moral and ethical concerns that were raised and addressed in different ways by the existentialism of Camus, the Marxism of Sartre, and the ethical philosophy of Levinas. Finally, some Dutch philosophers seemed especially capable of translating and introducing the sometimes difficult works of French and German philosophical thought to the humanities and the social sciences. Some scholars, such as William A. Luypen, Jan Hendrik van den Berg, Adriaan Peperzak, and Stephan Strasser, were translated into various languages, partly due to their ability to make the French and German traditions accessible and partly because they did this in sometimes highly unique and provocative ways.
Thus, it is not accidental that Sartre's 1946 L'Exis-tentialisme est line Humanisme is echoed in the title of William A. Luypen's 1959 Luypen's /1960 text Phenomenology and Humanism, subtitled A Primer in Existential Phenomenology. Luypen's book has been translated into many languages and reprinted numerous times. It departs from the "primitive fact" of existential phenomenology by emphasizing Husserl's notion of the lifeworld and his credo "Zw den Sachen selbst," interpreted as "Back to original experience," as well as the primacy of inten-tionality and the nature of phenomenological knowledge. The purpose of this point of departure is to work through a phenomenology of freedom and intersubjectivity by thematizing lifeworld phenomena such as the experience of ethics, liberation, work, hatred, indifference, love, and justice. Luypen did not merely want to translate, but also to reinterpret and rethink philosophically the phenomenological influence. For example, in Phenomenology and Humanism, he argues that Sartre is not really a phenomenologist, but a Cartesian thinker.
In the introduction to Phenomenology and Metaphysics, Luypen shows how he places himself in the philosophical tradition. He accuses Thomism of repeating old answers and thus ignoring new questions, and he shows how he himself was indebted to Heidegger. In other books, he elaborated on themes that he had identified in early work: Phenomenology of Natural Law (1967) , Phenomenology and Atheism (1964) , and Theology is Anthropology (1974) . His texts may now appear somewhat dated, but from the 1960s to the early 1980s, they exerted significant international influence within and outside the discipline of philosophy.
Reinout Bakker (1920 Bakker ( -1987 , professor of philosophical anthropology at the University of Groningen, made important contributions to the historical study of phenomenology. Husserl's Phenomenology (1967) . Kockelmans also published several books on phenomenology and science, for example, Phaenomenologie en Natuurwetenschap (1962) , published in English as Phenomenology and Physical Science (1966) . While at the University of Pennsylvania, he translated and edited a selection of studies written some 30 years earlier by proponents of the Utrecht School; they are published in Phenomenological Psychology: The Dutch School (1987) . Theo de Boer (1932-) Husserl (1966) , published in English as The Development of Husserl's Thought (1978 De Boer's philosophical anthropology is dialogic, emphasizing human intentionality, uniqueness, and authenticity. He argues that besides a philosophical articulation of anthropological postulates, psychology needs to be furnished with empirical material. The empirical "furnishing" refers back to the original aspirations of the Utrecht School. Phenomenological psychology is the scientific explication of the intentional structures of human being as situated existence. Interpretation is always incomplete. Interpretive psychology does not aim to arrive, via an alternative route, at naturalistic explanations of human behavior; rather, it demands an orientation toward difference and uniqueness and a receptive eye for what is contingent and unpredictable in the psychology of human existence.
In Tarnara A. Awater en Andere Verhalen over Sub-jectiviteit (Tamara A. Awater and Other Stories about Subjectivity) (1993), he suggests that the unique cannot be represented by the general; it can perhaps only be approached narratively. There will always be a distinction between philosophy and literature since, unlike literary narratives, philosophical arguments can never be decided by style. In 1997, de Boer published in English a very lucid introduction to Levinas entitled The Rationality of Transcendence: Studies in the Philosophy of Levinas. Husserl's Later Period (1920 -1938 . During his last years, Husserl had lost most of his German students owing to the Nazi threat, and he had become quite lonely. Even after his death, the threat continued, posing a serious danger to the survival of his unpublished writings. Van Breda assisted Husserl's widow in finding safe refuge in Belgium until she emigrated to the United States. And with the help of the Belgian External Affairs ministry, he succeeded in smuggling more than 45,000 pages written in shorthand into Belgium. In addition to Husserl's library, van Breda also managed to save some of Husserl's furnishings, such as his desk now on display in the Husserl Archives. It is largely due to the efforts of van Breda that the enormous wealth of Husserl's work is still in existence today. Van Breda succeeded in persuading Eugen Fink and Ludwig Landgrebe to come from Freiburg and Prague to Leuven. There they transcribed some 2800 pages of Husserl's old fashioned steno script.
THE HUSSERL ARCHIVES AND PHENOMENOLOGY IN FLANDERS
At the urging of van Breda, the Dutch publisher Martinus Nijhoff (now Kluwer) has been publishing, since 1950, the work of Husserl in the Husserliana series. More than 30 volumes have been produced to date. Since 1958, Martinus Nijhoff also has published the series Phcenomenologica, which at present includes more than 150 titles, offering an excellent overview of the development of philosophical phenomenology since Husserl.
After the war, Walter and Marly Biemel succeeded Fink and Landgrebe as associates of the Husserl Archives. After the death of van Breda in 1947, Rudolph Boehm undertook the editing of Husserliana. The directorship of the Husserl Archives was passed on to Samuel Usseling and subsequently to Rudolph Bernet.
In 1946, Alphonse de Waelhens (1911-) was appointed to the Chair of Philosophy at Leuven, where he adopted a similar critical orientation to the work of Husserl as had been taken by Beerling. He reinterpreted Husserl's work, especially from the perspective of Merleau-Ponty. According to de Waelhens, the initial phase of Husserl's phenomenology was purely idealistic; idealism was implied by Husserl's phenomenological method. But the concept of the lifeworld, as found in Krisis der euro-pdischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentalen Pha-nomenologie, is not compatible with such abstraction. While Husserl explicitly rejected an existentialist stance in his later work, de Waelhens felt that he was able to trace existentialist themes back to Husserl's earlier writings.
De Waelhens produced original commentaries on the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer, but his most interesting contribution was with respect to the place and significance he assigned to psychoanalysis. He argued that human self-knowledge is limited because human experience is limited. From a philosophical anthropological point of view, philosophy and science do not stand in a hierarchical but in a reciprocal relation; they need each other for a more comprehensive understanding of human existence. The same is true for the relation between philosophy and psychoanalysis, which requires a phenomenological reinterpre-tation of the unconscious.
The works of Antoine Vergote (1932-) , who was at Leuven, also extends the discussion about the relation between phenomenology and psychoanalysis. Similarly, psychoanalysis was a theme in the work of Samuel Usseling, who held a Chair in Philosophy at Leuven until 1997. Usseling's Retoriek en Filosofie (Rhetoric and Philosophy) (1976) was strongly inspired by Heidegger's thinking about language. In this text, Usseling distanced himself from his mentors de Waelhens and Kwant, and thus from Merleau-Ponty, since Merleau-Ponty accorded language less of a central place. Usseling oriented himself primarily to Heidegger, Nietzsche and Derrida, and he employed contemporary interpretations of ancient myths in reconsidering language and narrative discourse as sources of truth. A comprehensive overview of Usseling's work, which spans more than 30 years, is found in Macht en Onmacht (Power and Powerlessness) (1999) . A central theme in his work is that human beings construct their worlds through speaking and writing, but in these discourses, there is always something that eludes. Recently, Usseling has focussed on the question of the phenomenology of writing.
After the ^Anschluss in 1938 by the Nazis, Stephan Strasser (1905 Strasser ( -1991 It can be argued that the fundamental impulse of the late 1940s and 1950s, to which the various members of the Utrecht School were committed, was rooted in pedagogy. Dutch society was worried about the future of its youth, which had been dislocated and disenfranchised by the postwar turmoil. Thus, it is possible to discern a certain inclination among diverse representatives to integrate the various social disciplines. Humanism and personalism became key concepts. The psychologists, pedagogues, psychiatrists, criminologists, and jurists who constituted the intellectual membership of the Utrecht School were all sailing under the flag of the personal responsibility and social engagement of the individual human being. (1923) . However, in his interpretation of illness and health, Riimke's views were shaped by a Christian-humanistic anthropology, emphasizing the importance of authenticity. According to Riimke, deviant authenticity could actually be a sign of health, but what the ill person lacks is a balanced differentiation between openness and closedness. The condition of health is related to an integrated personhood in a disintegrated society.
Riimke 's approach was characterized by anti-psychiatric themes, but he was far ahead of his time. In the late 1940s, it had been the custom to place dysfunctional families under isolative supervision. But Riimke spoke against isolation in institutions and in favor of integration into society. He interpreted dysfunctional behavior as a possible expression of normal life struggles.
The academic career of the psychologist Buytendijk (1887 Buytendijk ( -1974 We want to understand the human being from the meaningful ground structure of that totality of situations, events, and cultural values to which he is oriented and about which he has consciousness, and to which all his actions, thoughts, and feelings are related-this is the world in which the person exists, which he encounters in the course of his personal history, and which he shapes through the meanings that he constructs and assigns to everything. The human person is not an "entity' with properties, but an initiative of relations to a world that he chooses and by which he is chosen.
According to Buytendijk, to understand human existence one does not start from what is simple or from the bottom up, but from the complex and from the top down. Similarly, animal psychology is best understood from the higher orders down. That approach is characteristic of all his work, from his Psychology of Animals (1920) to Prolegomena of an Anthropological Physiology (1965) . For example, in the latter book, he employs considerations about the idea of an anthropological physiology and aspects of human embodiment and psycho-physical problems to introduce a comprehensive study of exemplary modes of human existence and physiological regulatory systems. He describes in detail modes of being such as being-awake and asleep, being-tired, being-hungry, being-emotional, as well as regulatory aspects such as posture, respiration and circulation.
In general, the work by Buytendijk and many of his colleagues was more determined by attitude than by phenomenological method. In his personal life, Buytendijk was known for his unorthodox sense of morality and detachment from societal norms. Yet, he suggested that freedom can only be possible in recognition of a moral order. After his 50th birthday, Buytendijk converted from Protestantism to Catholicism. From Buytendijk's point of view, a central problem of our modernist age is the loss of trust and at-homeness in the world. As he might see it, a modernist recognition of autonomy could not be tempered by means of postmodern forms of critique but rather by pre-modern forms of understanding. Buytendijk rejected the claim to autonomy of the Renaissance ideal and reached back to recover a sense of obsequiousness and submissiveness of earlier times.
Buytendijk published his pedagogical ideas in Erzieh-ung zur Demut: Betrachtungen uber einige padagogische Ideen (Educating toward Humility: Some Reflections on Pedagogical Ideas) (1928) . During the war, he wrote his study Over de Pijn (Pain) (1946) , which still offers a relevant contemporary critique of the search for a life without suffering. While pain carries mostly negative connotations in today's world, Buytendijk pointed out that pain forces us to reflect and to give it a place and meaning in our lives.
Some philosophers, such as de Boer, regarded the Utrecht phenomenologists as good psychologists but often poor philosophers. In his opinion, they tried to represent empirical phenomenology contextualized by time and place as rigorous science. The well-known existential phenomenology of Buytendijk's De Vrouw: Haar Natuur, Verschijning, en Bestaan (Woman: Her Being, Appearance, and Existence) (1951) was simultaneously far ahead of its time and trapped by its time. It later received severe criticism from feminist commentators.
One can make the case that if stripped of their uni-versalistic pretensions the existential phenomenological studies of the Utrecht School still constitute the most original contribution of Dutch phenomenology. Even today, one may appreciate the brilliant reflective observations of its authors. Strasser's accusation of phenomenological impressionism does not really hold water since the highly recognizable time-and culture-bound descriptions were always contextualized by more or less explicit but never closed anthropological postulates.
Many phenomenologists of the Utrecht School were practically engaged. For example, Buytendijk wrote popular contributions about science in journals and magazines. He was editor-in-chief of the Aula book series, which has informed the public about science and philosophy for more than 50 years. Buytendijk was not only influenced by the great phenomenologists, he also functioned as an active thinker in his correspondence with the likes of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Helmuth Plessner, Max Scheler, Ludwig Binswanger, Romano Guardini, Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir.
Martinus J. Langeveld (1905 Langeveld ( -1989 Langeveld employed phenomenology at several levels. During the 1950s, he coordinated a large-scale national study of problem youth, and he was primarily responsible for integrating, in a phenomenological manner, the various reports of this study. The final analyses were inspired by the philosophies of Heidegger and Bollnow on building, dwelling and thinking. One of Langeveld's most influential texts was Beknopte Theoretische Pedagogiek (Concise Theoretical Pedagogy), in which he elaborated a phenomenological pedagogy. This work was published in 15 editions between 1946 and 1979. Langeveld analyzed the phenomena of child rearing and educational experiences by paying close attention to concrete and common situations and events in the lives of children and adults. This led to remarkable results. For example, he rejected the view that pedagogical authority should be related to general theory of authority. Authority is not just a question of moral choice; rather, authority is necessary because children require pedagogy for their very existence and in order to be able to grow up. Langeveld then linked this existential phenomenological starting point for the determination of authority to his philosophical anthropology, wherein self-responsible self-determination assumed a central value.
From our contemporary, postmodern perspective, it is easy to notice that there were certain universalistic pretensions in the work of proponents of the Dutch School and that Langeveld's phenomenological pedagogy was colored by the cultural and historical perspectives of his time. Langeveld did not really address the question about whether his phenomenological writing had general validity. But in his developmental psychology, he did emphasize that the phenomenon of childhood is a recent historical "discovery." Perhaps, the phenomenological studies of the Utrecht School are now less valid for their methodological aspirations, but they retain a high level of validity for their practical engagement. It is remarkable that many of Langeveld's studies-such as "De verborgen plaats in het leven van het kind" (The Secret Place in the Life of the Child) (1953), "Das Ding in die Welt des Kindes" (1956) (The Thing in the World of the Child), and "Phaeno-menologie van het Leren" (1952) (Phenomenology of Learning)-are still very readable and formative for understanding the pedagogical lifeworld.
In comparison with his extensive pedagogical, psychological, and clinical publications, Langeveld's methodological writings are quite sparse. He collected several articles in Capita uit de Algemene Methodologie der Opvoedingswetenschap (Principles of a General Methodology of Educational Science) (1959/1972) , and after some pressure, he eventually added a methodological chapter to his Beknopte Theoretische Pedagogiek (Concise Theoretical Pedagogy) (1955) . The members of the Utrecht School obviously shared an aversion to explicating methodological problems. Langeveld was quite clear about his relation to the work of Husserl. He did not acknowledge the scientific validity of a transcendental subjectivity, and he replaced the transcendental reduction with the method of immanent reduction, which stresses the situatedness and concrete particularity of human experience. He said "yes" to Husserl's method but "no" to his philosophical pretensions. Phenomenology had to remain focused on the everyday concerns of the concrete lifeworld.
Within the domain of pedagogy, and at the international level, Langeveld exercised a tremendous influence. He published numerous studies in the German language, some of which were never translated into Dutch. Indeed, in Germany he had been long recognized as a prominent "German" pedagogue.
Willem J. Pompe (1893 Pompe ( -1968 held the chair in Criminal Justice and Criminal Law at the University of Nijmegen from 1923 to 1928 and at the University of Utrecht from 1928 to 1968. In his valedictory lecture, "Strafrecht en Vertrouwen in de Mede-Mens" (Criminal Law and Trust in our Fellow Human Beings), his phe-nomenological anthropology came to full expression. Punishable infractions were first of all interpreted as transgressions of trust. The criminal was seen as a person who is aware of responsibility for the community. Punishment had to be seen as an opportunity for reconciliation and should work toward a good society. For Pompe, the distinction between criminal and normal behavior was only relative. In the court of justice, there should always remain the possibility for recognition of personal responsibility. In 1948, he formulated the legal principle of diminished responsibility to stand trial. This principle of relative responsibility is still used, and it implies a recognition of the other as absolute other. Irresponsibility in some respect does not fundamentally alter the existence of responsibility in other areas. And this other responsibility forms the possibility for integrative reconciliation.
Punishment was interpreted as an opportunity for being released from guilt. Revenge ought never be a reason for punishment. Thus, punishment played a pedagogical function and was seen as formative of social conscience. In Het Nieuwe Tijdperk en het Recht (The New Times and the Law) (1946), Pompe showed that both modern justice, which reduced the criminal to an inferior being, and ancient justice, which posited fundamental equality, led to problems. According to Pompe, the criminal had to be seen as an autonomous being, someone who had a place in the moral order. That is why requital, reconciliation, retribution, and retaliation received so much attention in his work. Other phenomenological criminologists associated with the Utrecht School included G. Th. Kempe, P. A. H. Baan, J. C. Hudig, R. Rijksen, and G. P. Hoefnagels.
Some of the most important and programmatic writings of the Utrecht School are to be found in collections. Psychology and Psycho-Pathology (1954) . It was launched as an international journal for phenomenological psychology, but only one volume appeared. A third volume worth mentioning is Rencontre, Encounter, Begegnung: A Humanistic Psychology (1957) . This book was edited by Langeveld and dedicated to Professor F. J. J. Buytendijk on the occasion of his retirement. It consists of 37 articles, more than half of which were in German or French.
In the Preface to Persoon en Wereld (1953) , van den Berg presents the program of existential or phenomenological psychology as a new psychology. He explicates how this psychology rejects both introspection and extra-spection. The rejection of introspective psychology means a refusal to study the other by studying oneself. The rejection of extraspection was a refusal to adopt the objectifying attitude of naturalistic scientific psychology. Instead, phenomenological psychology was interested in immediate experience and exploring the relation of the human being to his or her world. The phenomenologist resolves to stay as close as possible to the ordinary events of everyday life. In the Postscript to the same book, Linschoten offers a further elaboration of the program of the Utrecht School. In a clear statement, he anticipates the inappropriateness of Strasser's well-known critique of the work of the Utrecht School as "phenomenological impressionism."
Strasser had formulated his critique with reference to the work of Sartre in his Fenomenologie en Empirische Menskunde (Phenomenology and the Human Sciences) (1963), but everyone knew that it was meant to apply especially to the proponents of the Utrecht School. In the Postscript, Linschoten shows why phenomenological psychology was interested in literary sources and why a sharp distinction must be made between poetics and science. The so-called literary approach of the Utrecht School should not be regarded as a sign of an overly suggestive rhetorical use of language motivated by unfounded impressionistic opinions; instead, it belonged to a systematic methodical approach to the lifeworld. Linschoten argues that vivid description has the function of bringing the things of our lifeworld into nearness. Literary material can be used as a resource. But according to Linschoten, phenomenology starts where the novel or poem stops. Phenomenological clarification is an explication of meaning that proceeds in a hermeneutic circle.
In the introductory essay to Phenomenological Psychology: The Dutch School (1987) , Kockelmans, too, observes how the phenomenologists of the Utrecht School frequently make use of poetry and literature. He sees three reasons: (1) Many "great poets and novelists have seen something very important and have spoken of it in a remarkably adequate way" that is useful for phenomenological explication; (2) phenomenologists may use literary sources "to illustrate a point on which the phenomenologists wishes to focus attention"; and (3) most important, "poetic language... is able to refer beyond the realm of what can be said 'clearly and distinctly'" (Kockelmans 1987, pp. viii, ix) . Kockelmans adds that it is important to note that no author he includes in his collection of studies from the Dutch School has used literary work as a substitute for the work that the author has tried to accomplish. Poems and novels do not prove anything, says Kockelmans, but "both can be enormously helpful in bringing certain phenomena closer to us and... helping us to understand ourselves and the world in which we live" (p. ix).
One phenomenologist of the Dutch School was especially conscious of the historical and cultural embedded-ness of phenomenological psychology. In fact, he was far ahead of the later postmodern critique of the dangers of foundationalism, essentialism, and historical and cultural universalism. Jan Hendrik van den Berg argued that the very project of all phenomenology was contextualized by the limits of language, culture, time, and place. According to van den Berg, phenomenological psychology does not claim to have found a universally valid approach to human phenomena; rather, it is always self-conscious of its anthropological starting point. Therefore, it is futile to speak of a general phenomenology of perception since people from different cultures "see" differently, and people see and understand their worlds differently from the ways that their close and distant forebears did, just as their own children will perceive the world differently. As an example, van den Berg criticizes such studies as the Kinsey report, entitled The Sexual Behavior of the Human Male. He suggests that while this report might be characteristic of the North American male it says virtually nothing about, for example, the European male.
After completing a primary and secondary teacher education program, van While the work of van den Berg continues to draw interest, it is true that after the retirement of Buytendijk in 1957 the reputation of the Utrecht School began to wane in psychology, law, and psychiatry. In hindsight, this decline is often attributed to Buytendijk's student and successor Jan Linschoten, who had been one of the most gifted representatives of the movement of phenomenological psychology during the 1950s. But when in the mid-1960s Linschoten started to lecture about De Idolen van de Psychologic (The Idols of Psychology) (1964), the phenomenological tradition of the Utrecht School received a serious blow as a result of his apparent defection. And yet, Linschoten did not really turn his back on phenomenology as such. In "Die Unumganglichkeit der Phanomenologie" (1962), he argues that "phenomenological psychology" is a philosophical discipline especially suited for studying the pre-reflective sphere of the lifeworld in various domains. But "psychology" is also the scientific discipline that focuses on psychological phenomena using quantitative, experimental, and empirical analytic methods.
The demise of the Utrecht School also came from the outside. A few years earlier Adriaan D. de Groot had published his empirical-analytical Methodology (1961) , and this triggered a new trend away from lifeworld oriented studies. In his book, he assigned phenomenology a minor role in the preparatory phase of "real" empirical research. Phenomenology was regarded as too subjective and unscientific. The influence of de Groot's Methodology reached far beyond the domain of the social and human sciences into the humanities. It also opened the door for the increasing influence of American behaviorism on Dutch soil. As well, the phenomenological tradition had come under attack from Marxist critical theory originating in Germany and from the post-structuralism of new French authors.
And yet, while psychology lost much of its phenomenological support in the Netherlands, this was not quite true for disciplines such as pedagogy or education. Within the broad domain of pedagogy, the Utrecht School remained active, even after the retirement of Langeveld in 1972. During the 1950s and 1960s, Edith E. A. Vermeer produced studies about play, and Nicolaas Beets wrote about the lifeworld of the adolescent. Rob Lubbers developed a more hermeneutic orientation to the study of pedagogy. During the 1970s and 1980s, Ton A. J. Beekman, in collaboration with Karel Mulderij en Hans Bleeker, devised a practical method for phenomenological pedagogy by injecting a reflective approach to lived experiences with ethnographic participant observation procedures. Bleeker and Mulderij studied children's experiences of living spaces and physically handicapped children's experiences of their bodies and wheelchairs. Lennart Vriens conducted lifeworld research in the area of peace education.
In recent years, further developments in phenomenological methodology, as originally inspired by the Dutch School, are more likely found outside than inside the Dutch borders. There are examples of contemporary developments that reach back to the Utrecht School in their concern with the concrete particulars of everyday life. These phenomenological methods are now more sensitive to subjective and intersubjective roots of meaning, to the complexity of relations between language and experience, to the cultural and gendered contexts of interpretive meaning, and to the textual dimensions of phenomenological writing and reflection (see, for example, Researching Lived Experience (1990/97) and The Tact of Teaching (1991) by Max van Manen and Childhood's Secrets (1996) by Max van Manen and Bas Levering). The growing interest in the relevance of such phenomenological research methodologies for the knowledge base of professional practices attests to the vitality of concerns with reflective interpretation, the experience of sensitive understanding, and humanistic impulses as they are applied in the disciplinary domains of pedagogy, the health sciences, and psychology.
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